When I meet someone who plays bridge, I feel an immediate affinity for them. It's not because I really know anything about them beyond their taste in card games. For all I know, we could be like oil and water once we actually start talking. But we both love bridge, and that makes me more likely to connect with someone.
当我遇到一个打桥牌的人,我会立即对他产生亲近感。这并不是因为我对他们在纸牌游戏的喜好之外有任何真正的了解。据我所知,一旦开始交谈,我们之间可能就像油和水一样。但我们都喜欢桥牌,这让我更有可能与某人建立联系。
There are few forces stronger than the power of group identity. The groups we self-identify as are a key part of who we are. Most of the time, these identities aren’t inherently positive or negative—but each one of them shapes the way we see the world.
很少有某种力量比群体认同的力量更强大。我们自我认同的群体是构成自我认知的关键部分。大多数时候,这些身份本身并不意味着积极或消极——但每一种身份都塑造了我们看待世界的方式。
In his terrific book Why We’re Polarized, Ezra Klein argues that identity is the answer to the question suggested by his title. The phrase “identity politics” has been thrown around a lot in recent years—usually in a negative context—but Klein explains that it’s human instinct to let our group identities guide our decision making. “A group can know more and reason better than an individual,” he says, “and thus human beings with the social and intellectual skills to pool knowledge had a survival advantage over those who didn’t.”
埃兹拉·克莱因(Ezra Klein)在他的杰作《为什么我们会两极分化》(中文名暂译)中提出,身份即是这本书名所提出的问题的答案。近年来,“身份政治”一词被广泛使用——通常是在消极的语境中——但克莱因解释说,让我们的群体身份指导我们的决策是人类的本能。“一个群体可以比个人知道得更多,更好地进行推理,”他说,“因此具有社交和智力技能来汇集知识的人比那些没有这种技能的人更具有生存优势。”
Why We’re Polarized is fundamentally a book about American politics, but I thought it was also a fascinating look at human psychology. One of my main takeaways was that many of us might need to reframe how we think about changing someone’s mind. I’m a data person (another identity I have!), so my instinct is always to use numbers and logic to convince people of something. When I meet someone who disagrees with me, I tend to explain the merits of my position and compare results of the two different approaches.
《为什么我们会两极分化》基本上是一本关于美国政治的书,但我认为书中对人类心理学的观察也很吸引人。我的一个主要收获是,我们中的许多人可能需要重新定义如何改变别人想法的方式。我是一个数据星人(这是我的另一个身份!),所以我的直觉总是用数字和逻辑来说服人们相信某件事。当遇到与我观点相左的人时,我倾向于解释自己立场的优点并比较两种不同方法的结果。
But Why We’re Polarized makes it clear that group identity can overrule any argument for or against an issue. If you want to bridge the gap, it’s more productive to appeal to someone’s identity than to their logic.
但《为什么我们会两极分化》一书清楚地表明,群体身份可以推翻任何支持或反对某个问题的论点。如果你想消除差异,通过身份认同来吸引某人比通过逻辑更有效率。
This is especially true for political issues. Klein explains how political identity used to be more rooted in where you lived rather than what party you belonged to. (This wasn’t always a good thing: He devotes an entire chapter to the damaging influence of the Dixiecrats.) The parties themselves were seen more as shortcuts you could use to inform your choices. “We may not know the precise right level of taxes… but we know whether we support the Democratic, Republican, Green, or Libertarian party,” Klein says.
对于政治问题尤其如此。克莱因解释了过去政治身份是如何更多地源于你的居住地,而不是你所属的政党。(这并不总是一件好事:他用一整章的篇幅讲述迪克西党徒的破坏性影响。)政党本身更多地被视为你用来宣告自己选择的捷径。“我们可能不知道准确的税收水平……但我们知道我们是支持民主党、共和党、绿党还是自由党,”克莱因说。
Americans tended to vote for candidates who made the most sense for where they lived rather than whether they were a Democrat or Republican, which led to a lot more ticket splitting. Between 1972 and 1980, 46 percent of voters in contested districts voted for a different party House candidate from who they supported for president. By 2018, only 3 percent of voters did.
美国人倾向于投票给对他们居住地最有影响的候选人,而不是取决于他们是民主党人还是共和党人,这导致了更多的选票分裂。在1972年至1980年间,有争议的选区中有46%的选民在众议院选举中投票给了与他们支持的总统来自不同政党的候选人。到2018年,只有3%的选民这样做了。
What changed? The political parties themselves. For a lot of different reasons—starting with the fight for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and including the rise of cable news—both parties have to varying degrees adopted more extreme positions over the last several decades. As a result, the party identities themselves have become more polarized and caused people to dig in more firmly.
什么发生了变化?是政党本身。由于多种多样的原因——从争取1964年民权法案的斗争开始,也包括有线电视新闻的兴起——共和与民主两党在过去的几十年里都在不同程度上采取了更极端的立场。结果,政党身份本身变得更加两极分化,从而使人们愈发陷入其中。
I was especially interested to read what Klein had to say about the relationship between social media and polarization. The internet gets a lot of criticism for how it has divided us, but people were seeking out media that corresponded to their political affiliation well before social media. At the same time, it is undeniable, that its ability to connect the fringes of the parties together has exacerbated the situation. When you look at something like January 6th, it’s clear that the internet played a role in enabling the most extreme people to find each other and organize.
我对克莱因关于社交媒体与两极分化之间关系的看法特别感兴趣。互联网因其如何分化了我们而受到很多批评,但人们在使用社交媒体之前就在寻找与其政治派别相对应的媒体。与此同时,不可否认的是,互联网将党派的各周边派系联系在一起的能力加剧了这一局势。当你看到像2021年1月6日美国国会暴乱这样的事件时,很明显,互联网在让最极端的人找到彼此并组织集结这方面发挥了作用。
Overall, though, Klein thinks that our polarization problem goes much deeper than just social media. He’s quite persuasive, and I agree with him. Like most books, he is much better about diagnosing the problem and educating us on the historical context than he is at offering solutions. Klein has a couple ideas about improvements we could make—such as restructuring the Supreme Court or changing the Electoral College—but he acknowledges none of them are a true solution.
不过,总的来说,克莱因认为我们的两极分化问题远不止社交媒体。他很有说服力,我也同意他的看法。与他的大多数书籍一样,比起提供解决方案,他更擅长诊断问题和教育我们了解历史背景。克莱因对我们可以做出的改进有几个想法——比如重组最高法院或改变选举人团制度——不过他承认这些并非真正的解决方案。
At the end of last year, I said that one of my plans for 2022 was to read more about polarization. It’s a problem I’m quite concerned about, and this helped me understand the phenomena much better. I wouldn’t say I finished the book more optimistic about our ability to tackle the problem, which is even more daunting than I thought. But if you want to understand what’s going on with politics in the United States, this is the book to pick up.
去年年底,我说过2022年计划之一是阅读更多关于两极分化的书。这是我非常关心的一个问题,而这本书帮我更好地理解了这些现象。我不会说读完这本书让我对解决这一问题的能力感到更加乐观,相反,它比我想象得更加令人生畏。但如果你想了解美国的政治状况,这本书值得一看。