出版社: Cambridge University Press
出版年: 2005-12-19
页数: 434
定价: USD 66.00
装帧: Hardcover
ISBN: 9780521855266
内容简介 · · · · · ·
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy...
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy的创作者
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达龙·阿西莫格鲁 作者
作者简介 · · · · · ·
Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under a...
Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).
目录 · · · · · ·
Section 1. Paths of Political Development: 1. Britain; 2. Argentina; 3. Singapore; 4. South Africa, 5. The agenda;
Section 2. Our Argument: 1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy; 2. Building blocks of our approach; 3. Towards our basic story; 4. Our theory of democratization; 5. Democratic consolidation; 6. Determinants of democracy; 7. Political identities and the nature of conflict; 8. Democracy in a picture; 9. Overview of the book;
Section 3. What Do We Know About Democracy?: 1. Measuring democracy; 2. Patterns of democracy; 3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution; 4. Crises and democracy; 5. Social unrest and democratization; 6. The literature; 7. Our contribution;
Part II. Modelling Politics;
Section 4. Democratic Politics: 1. Introduction; 2. Aggregating individual preferences; 3. Single-peaked preferences and the median voter theorem; 4. Our workhorse models; 5. Democracy and political equality; 6. Conclusion;
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Section 1. Paths of Political Development: 1. Britain; 2. Argentina; 3. Singapore; 4. South Africa, 5. The agenda;
Section 2. Our Argument: 1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy; 2. Building blocks of our approach; 3. Towards our basic story; 4. Our theory of democratization; 5. Democratic consolidation; 6. Determinants of democracy; 7. Political identities and the nature of conflict; 8. Democracy in a picture; 9. Overview of the book;
Section 3. What Do We Know About Democracy?: 1. Measuring democracy; 2. Patterns of democracy; 3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution; 4. Crises and democracy; 5. Social unrest and democratization; 6. The literature; 7. Our contribution;
Part II. Modelling Politics;
Section 4. Democratic Politics: 1. Introduction; 2. Aggregating individual preferences; 3. Single-peaked preferences and the median voter theorem; 4. Our workhorse models; 5. Democracy and political equality; 6. Conclusion;
Section 5. Nondemocratic Politics: 1. Introduction; 2. Power and constraints in nondemocratic politics; 3. Modeling preferences and constraints in nondemocracies; 4. Commitment problems; 5. A simple game of promises; 6. A dynamic model; 7. Incentive compatible promises; 8. Conclusion;
Part III. The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy;
Section 6. Democratization: 1. Introduction; 2. The role of political institutions; 3. Preferences over political institutions; 4. Political power and institutions; 5. A 'static' model of democratization; 6. Democratization or repression?; 7. A dynamic model of democratization; 8. Subgame perfect equilibria; 9. Alternative political identities; 10. Targeted transfers; 11. Power of the elite in democracy; 12. Ideological preferences over regimes; 13. Democratization in pictures; 14. Equilibrium revolutions; 15. Conclusion;
Section 7. Coups and Consolidation: 1. Introduction; 2. Incentives for coups; 3. A static model of coups; 4. A dynamic model of the creation and consolidation of democracy; 5. Alternative political identities; 6. Targeted transfers; 7. Power in democracy and coups; 8. Consolidation in a picture; 9. Defensive coups; 10. Conclusion;
Part IV. Putting the Models to Work;
Section 8. The Role of the Middle Class: 1. Introduction; 2. The three-class model; 3. Emergence of partial democracy; 4. From partial to full democracy; 5. Repression: the middle class as a buffer; 6. Repression: soft-liners vs. hard-liners; 7. The role of the middle class in consolidating democracy; 8. Conclusion;
Section 9. Economic Structure and Democracy: 1. Introduction; 2. Economic structure and income distribution; 3. Political conflict; 4. Capital, land and the transition to democracy; 5. Financial integration; 6. Increased political integration; 7. Alternative assumptions about the nature of international trade. 8. Conclusion; Part V. Conclusion and The Future of Democracy;
Section 10. Conclusion and the Future of Democracy: 1. Paths of political development revisited; 2. Extension and areas for future research; 3. The future of democracy;
Part VI. Appendix;
Section 11. Appendix to Section 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy: 1. Introduction; 2. Probabilistic voting models; 3. Lobbying; 4. Partisan politics and political capture.
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民主与经济的微笑曲线
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上海财经大学出版社 (2008)8.8分 211人读过
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上海财经大学出版社 (2021)暂无评分 6人读过
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订阅关于Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy的评论:
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1 有用 中间偏右 2012-06-11 08:50:44
难怪有些人觉得现在经济学家来做政治科学是不负责,这都是什么啊。
3 有用 Sisyphus 2012-02-13 12:21:13
民主研究的必读,细细咀嚼
0 有用 七月。 2015-11-22 21:44:24
靶子。
4 有用 门卫 2018-01-24 06:51:06
可以从nondemocracy这章开始看,因为democracy那一章都是中间选民和唐斯模型。acemoglu一直都是开始的想法很简单,但是总能从最简洁的模型中勾勒出一般性的模型来解释非常复杂的问题。这样做的缺陷也是非常明显的,尤其在涉足政治历史话题的时候,所以political science的人当然对他不买账。革命的群体可能并不能一般化为穷人,民主的收益与结果可能也取决于各国的历史文化政治遗产... 可以从nondemocracy这章开始看,因为democracy那一章都是中间选民和唐斯模型。acemoglu一直都是开始的想法很简单,但是总能从最简洁的模型中勾勒出一般性的模型来解释非常复杂的问题。这样做的缺陷也是非常明显的,尤其在涉足政治历史话题的时候,所以political science的人当然对他不买账。革命的群体可能并不能一般化为穷人,民主的收益与结果可能也取决于各国的历史文化政治遗产。但这也是对political science规范化的一种尝试。 (展开)
0 有用 Dubos 2010-04-12 18:00:52
我还是买paperback吧,省钱。2011年12月,不要好高骛远。
0 有用 柏拉图下港口 2024-03-22 20:33:57 日本
最核心的原则是围绕经济利益的冲突论。本书严格建立在博弈论分析的框架之上,而博弈论的精神,便是“选择、互动和回报”。制度变迁是博弈中各行为体选择自己能使用的策略并互动的结果,而驱使个体顺应或改变某一制度的原因则在于个体对不同制度下自己相对效用的感知,而本书把这里的“效用”界定为由经济利益表示的间接效用。可经济效用是从哪里来的?一个很重要的预设是“心理上的零和博弈”,也就是收入的绝对增长是不重要的,自... 最核心的原则是围绕经济利益的冲突论。本书严格建立在博弈论分析的框架之上,而博弈论的精神,便是“选择、互动和回报”。制度变迁是博弈中各行为体选择自己能使用的策略并互动的结果,而驱使个体顺应或改变某一制度的原因则在于个体对不同制度下自己相对效用的感知,而本书把这里的“效用”界定为由经济利益表示的间接效用。可经济效用是从哪里来的?一个很重要的预设是“心理上的零和博弈”,也就是收入的绝对增长是不重要的,自己相对于其他人的收入才重要(因此所有人的收入都可以表示为平均收入的比例,而生产力的进步、规模扩张等与正和博弈相关的可能性被排除了),对经济效用的争夺表现为对再分配的争夺。只要收入差异客观存在,阶级之间的冲突便不可调和,最多只是被“抑制”——即达成某种博弈均衡。这倒很符合恩格斯和列宁的阶级与国家观。 (展开)
0 有用 江湖骗 2022-05-09 23:27:57
我没读完,我有罪
0 有用 keytabris 2022-04-25 14:25:14
本书应该成为所有社科研究者的必读书。选题还是模型推演都无可挑剔。
0 有用 达伦终结者 2022-04-17 12:42:44
看了第一第二第六和第十一章,数学部分倒还好(只要信任作者们就可以2333)。对于政治哲学家来说至少这本书的工作应该让我们重新思考平等和民主之间的关系以及多元主义和民主之间的关系(哪怕是做ideal theory的)。对我来说收获的新知识是不平等的加剧反而应该会减弱精英选择转型的动力,并愿意负担更高昂的成本来压制(好像说出来这就是一个特别常识的命题,但是另一方面很多人都会认为是相反的情况)。
0 有用 白菜爱好者 2021-12-14 01:29:57
民主理论必读; solid justification for democracy